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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Notwithstanding the fact that they may validly be given authority
to impose penalties, administrative boards have not yet been given the
power to order imprisonment. There is little need for administrative
boards to operate in this area, and public opinion would be strongly
against executive officials prescribing such punishment.26 In the Wong
Wing case27 the Court felt that a person should have a judicial trial
before he could be punished by having his liberty taken away.
MARSHALL T. SPEARs, JR.
Corporations-Foreign-Suability After Dissolution
Under the common law the dissolution of a corporation extinguished
its debts, actions against it were abated, its real property reverted to its
grantors, and its personal property escheated to the King.' The event
was likened to the death of a natural person.2 This rule was tolerated
so long as there were only municipal, ecclesiastical, and eleemosynary
corporations in existence. But with the growth of business corporations,
accompanied by their shareholders and creditors, the harshness of such
a rule was manifest, and the equity courts were persuaded that the assets
of a dissolved corporation should be declared a trust fund for the satis-
faction of claims by creditors and other interested parties.3 A later
development was the almost universal adoption of statutes which ex-
tended the life of a corporation after dissolution so that it could bring
and defend actions in the corporate name for the purpose of "winding
up" its affairs.
4
But extension statutes have not been completely effective, for much
confusion still exists when an action is brought involving as a party a
foreign corporation which has been dissolved by the state which created
it. In such a case the general rule is said to be that the law of the
creating state governs, and that when the corporation's very existence
is terminated by the state of domicile it cannot be a party to a suit else-
where. Similarly, if the law of the creating state extends the life of
the corporation after dissolution for a winding up period, it may gen-
erally sue or be sued in other jurisdictions because it still exists as an
entity for that purpose.6 On the other hand, these extensions may be
20 GELLHORN, op. cit. supra note 25, 348.
163 U. S. 228 (1895).
See Life Ass'n. of America v. Fassett, 102 Ill. 315 (1882); 2 BEALE, CON-
FLcr oF LAws 742 (1935); 17 FLETCHER CYCL. CoRe. 775 (1942); Note, 97
A. L. R. 483 (1935).
"See Chicago Title Co. v. Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U. S. 120, 124 (1937).
' Marcus, Suability of Dissolved Corporations, 58 HRV. L. REv. 675 (1945).
' 16 FLETCHER CYcL. CORP. 930 (1942).
*2 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 742; Note, 47 A. L. R. 1288, 1557 (1927).8 Harris-Woodbury Lumber Co. v. Coffin, 179 Fed. 257 (W. D. N. C. 1910).
aff'd, 187 Fed. 1005 (4th Cir. 1911).
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termed only procedural remedies, to be controlled by the law of the
forum.7 When the law of the forum expressly extends the life of a
dissolved foreign corporation, a judgment obtained under it will be good,
at least within the jurisdictiori,8 on the theory that a state may exclude
foreign corporations completely or impose what conditions it chooses to
their admittance. Consequently, the state may force the submission to
suits after dissolution as a requisite to entrance.9 This power may also
derive from the absolute control a state has over property within its
jurisdiction, which control is not subject to the laws or acts of another
state.10 Difficulties arise because the majority of the extension statutes
do not expressly state whether they are applicable to foreign corpora-
tions or only to domestic corporations. Further, in many states an im-
portant exception to the statutory control is the rule that local creditors
may get at local assets of the dissolved foreign corporation by in ren
proceedings."
In a recent District of Columbia case,12 the plaintiff sought to enforce
a money claim in the District's municipal court against a Pennsylvania
insurance corporation which had been dissolved under Pennsylvania
law; and at the same time the plaintiff attached automobiles and funds
of the corporation in the District of Columbia. Under the Pennsyl-
vania law, title to the corporation's property was vested in a statutory
liquidator without providing for any subsequent actions in the corporate
name.'3 The District of Columbia Code provided that dissolved cor-
porations might be sued in their corporate name for causes accruing
'Peoria Engineering Co. v. Streator Cold Storage Door Co., 221 Iowa 690,
266 N. W. 548 (1936).
'Life Ass'n. of America v. Fassett, 102 Ill. 315 (1882) ; Hanger v. Inter-
national Trading Co., 184 Ky. 794, 214 S. W. 438 (1919); Stetson v. City Bank
of New Orleans, 2 Ohio St. 167 (1853); Dupont Engineering Co. v. John P.
Harvey Const. Co., 156 Va. 582, 158 S. E. 891 (1931) ; cf., Rogers v. Adriatic F.
Ins. Co., 148 N. Y. 34, 42 N.E. 515 (1895) (New York refused to give full faith
and credit to an Illinois judgment because taken against a dissolved New York
corporation, but the court recognized the validity of the judgment in Illinois);
RESTATEMENT, CoNFucr or LAWS §158, Comment d (1934). For a suggestion
that such judgments should be entitled to full faith and credit everywhere, see
Marcus, supra note 3, at 694.
See Washington v. Superior Court, 289 U. S. 361 (1933). There are ex-
ceptions to this power in the case of interstate commerce and federal business.
" McGoon v. Scales, 9 Wall. 30 (U. S. 1870); City Ins. Co. v. Commercial
Bank, 68 Ill. 348 (1873).
"1 Clark v. Williard, 294 U. S. 211 (1935); Watts v. Southern Surety Co.,
216 Iowa 150, 248 N. W. 347 (1933) (garnishment); Hibernia Nat. Bank v.
Lacombe, 27 Hun. 166 (N. Y. 1880), aff'd, 84 N. Y. 367 (1881). The in ren
proceedings also involve a determination by the local court that the corporation
exists, to the extent that it owns the property, and the cases make no distinction
in the reasoning between this and an in personam proceeding in so far as the ex-
istence of the corporation as a party is concerned.
1 Sedgwich v. Beasley, 173 F. 2d 918 (D. C. Cir. 1949); cf., Beasley v. Fox.
173 F. 2d 920 (D. C. Cir. 1949) (abatement of an action against the same defend-
ant though it was pending at the time of dissolution).1 340 P. S. PA. §206 (1930).
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prior to dissolution. 14 The Pennsylvania liquidator had an ancillary
receiver appointed in the Federal District Court for the District of
Columbia, who attacked plaintiff's action on the ground that the cor-
poration was not suable because of its dissolution in Pennsylvania. The
District Court ordered that the receiver take over the attached property
and that plaintiff not proceed with his action, but this to be "without
prejudice to any lien, priority or preference" he might assert in the
receivership. On appeal the order was affirmed on the ground that
plaintiff's suit and attachment was null and void because the Pennsyl-
vania statutes did not preserve a right of action, and that in the absence
of such an extension, the corporation was "dead," just as if it were a
natural person. The District of Columbia Code was held not applicable
to foreign corporations.
The Court cites leading cases likening dissolution to the death of a
natural person, but none involved foreign corporations.1 5 The only case
cited holding that the law of the creating state controls involved an
action brought by a dissolved foreign corporation in the District of
Columbia, 6 and that Code by its terms applies only to suits against dis-
solved corporations; therefore, it could not have been applicable. The
case is silent regarding which receivership plaintiff is relegated to, and
the general rule has the ancillary receiver transmit assets direct to the
primary receiver in Pennsylvania. 7 This is subject to the court's right
to protect local creditors,' 8 but at best the plaintiff has lost some rights,
because he is not in the same position that he would be in if he had
obtained a judgment. An attachment should constitute a prior lien if
made before the foreign liquidator asserts his title, even though subse-
quent to the vesting of his title at the corporation's domicile.' 9 It is
interesting to note that had the court looked to the Pennsylvania law
applicable to such a situation, with a mind to the retaliatdry decisions
prevalent in this intergovernmental sphere, it would have found that the
Pennsylvania local law would have been applied to permit the action
against the dissolved foreign corporation.2 0
14 D. C. CODE §29-718 (1940).
"' Chicago Title Co. v. Wilcox, 302 U. S. 120 (1937) (dissolution as a bar to a
bankruptcy petition); Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 273 U. S. 257
(1927) (domestic corporation); National Bank v. Colby, 21 Wall. 609 (U. S.
18742 (a federal corporation).
Glennan v. Lincoln Inv. Corp., 110 F. 2d 130 (D. C. Cir. 1940) (policy con-
siderations favoring local creditors are not involved when the action is by the
dissolved foreign corporation).
"In re Stoddard, 242 N. Y. 148, 151 N. E. 159 (1926). See Note, 45 A. L. R632 (1926).63 See note 17 supra.
10 Clark v. Williard, 294 U. S. 211 (1935) ; Kruger v. Bank, 123 N. C. 16, 31
S. E. 270 (1898). See Note, 98 A. L. R. 351 (1935).
" Nazareth Cement Co. v. Union Indemnity Co., 116 Pa. Super. 506, 177 Atl.
64 (1935) (Louisiana dissolution receiver has no extraterritorial powers except
through comity, and that not extended when local creditors would be hurt);
Dehue v. Hillman Inv. Co., 110 F. 2d 456 (3d Cir. 1940).
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The basic dispute stems from a conflict beween the desire to insure
a pro rata distribution of the assets among all creditors by a central
receiver, and a desire to protect local creditors so that they will not have
to go to a foreign jurisdiction to prove their claim. The courts that
apply the law of the forum to permit suits against the dissolved foreign
corporation are not uniform in their reasoning. The law of the forum
may be termed remedial and thus controlling ;21 the court may presume
the foreign law is similar when it is not shown otherwise in the
record ;22 the constitutional provision for equal protection of the laws
may be held to require the same treatment for foreign as for domestic
corporations ;23 the public policy of the forum in protecting its citizens
may deny effect to the foreign law ;24 or a general statute may prohibit
any discrimination in favor of foreign corporations. 2 5  Suability is also
obtained by: attacking the jurisdiction of the dissolving court ;20 declar-
ing the dissolution not effective until judicially enforced in the forum ;27
ruling that the receiver's appearance waives his objection ;28 allowing the
action as an in rem proceeding, attachment, or garnishment ;29 or by
refusing to accept the analogy to death and cessation of existence, and
thereby allowing suit against those who stand in the corporation's place
in the corporate name.30
Much of the authority cited as holding that the foreign law governs
" Peoria Enginering Co. v. Streator Cold Storage Door Co., 221 Iowa 690,
266 N. W. 548 (1936); Stetson v. New Orleans City Bank, 2 Ohio St. 167(1853).8 Bad's, Inc. v. Frankel, 56 Ohio App. 305, 10 N. E. 2d 787 (1937).
23 Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Speer, 206 Ark. 216, 174 S. W. 2d 547
(1943).
2 4 Vladikovkazski R. R. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N. Y. 369, 189 N. E.
456 (1934).
"Van Schaick v. Parsons, 11 F. Supp. 654 (D. Mont. 1935) (Nebraska judg-
ment against dissolved New York corporation enforced in Montana); Castle v.
Acrogen Coal Co., 145 Ky. 591, 140 S. W. 1034 (1911); Frink v. National Mut.
F. Ins. Co., 90 S. C. 544, 74 S. E. 33 (1912) ; McCrary Refrigerator Sales Corp.
v. Davis, 140 S. W. 2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), reVd on other grounds, 136
Tex. 296, 150 S. W. 2d 377 (1941) (action proper until the corporation's ten
year certificate expired) ; DuPont Engineering Co. v. John P. Harvey Const. Co.,
156 Va. 582, 158 S. E. 891 (1931).
Olds v. City Trust, S. D. & Surety Co., 185 Mass. 500, 70 N. E. 1022 (1904).2 7 Hammond v. National Life Ass'n., 58 App. Div. 453, 69 N. Y. S. 585 (1901).
28 McGoon v. Scales, 9 Wall. 23 (U. S. 1870) ; Trounstine v. Baur, Pogue &
Co., 44 F. Supp. 767 (S. D. N. Y. 1942), aff'd, 144 F. 2d 379 (2d Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 323 U. S. 777 (1944).
" Clark v. Williard, 294 U. S. 211 (1935) ; Alwart Bros. Coal Co. v. Pitts-
burgh F. Ins. Co., 253 Ill. App. 361 (1930); City Ins. Co. v. Commercial Bank,
68 III. 348 (1873); Watts v. Southern Surety Co., 216 Iowa 150, 248 N. W. 347
(1933) ; Zacher v. Fidelity Trust & Safety Vault Co., 109 Ky. 441, 59 S. W. 493
(1900); Rawlings v. American Oil Co., 173 Miss. 683, 161 So. 851 (1935);
Hibernia Nat. Bk.-v. Lacombe, 27 Hun. 166 (N. Y. 1880), aff'd, 84 N . Y. 367
(1881) ; Nazareth Cement Co. v. Union Indemnity Co., 116 Pa. Super. 506, 177
Atl. 64 (1935); Davis v. Amra Grotto M.O.V.P.E.R., 169 Tenn. 564, 89 S. W.
2d 754 (1936) ; 8 THoMPsoN, CORPORATIONS §6518 (3d ed. 1927).
" James & Co. v. Second Russian Insurance Co., 239 N. Y. 248, 146 N. E. 369
(1925).
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is found to come from cases in which the foreign law applied extends the
corporation's existence,31 or is in agreement with the local law in doing
so, thus conforming to a policy of suability and actually leaving some sort
of entity to sue or be sued.32 Of the few cases holding that the foreign
law works a bar to suits by or against the dissolved foreign corporation
in the local courts, the great majority specifically point out that the
local claimant has an equitable remedy against local assets.3 3 One Cali-
fornia case denied an action to a Nevada corporation, which would have
had capacity under California law, because its Nevada dissolution was
by way of a penalty for law violations, but this theory should not be
applicable to suits against the corporation. 34 Michigan denied an action
against a corporation because it deemed full faith and credit must be
accorded its Pennsylvania dissolution,35 but the United States Supreme
Court has held that this does not prevent local attachment of the cor-
poration's property even though title to it has passed to a statutory
liquidator by operation of the foreign law.30
North Carolina has a satute which extends dissolved corlorations for
a winding up period of three years,37 but no state case has decided
" Pendleton v. Russell, 144 U. S. 640 (1892) ; Treemond Co. v. Schering Corp.,
122 F. 2d 702 (2d Cir. 1941); Dundee Mortg. Trust Inv. Co. v. Hughes, 89 Fed.
182 (C. C. Ore. 1898); Action v. Washington Times Co., 12 F. Supp. 257 (D.
Md. 1935); Kratky v. Andrews, 244 Minn. 486, 28 N. W. 2d 624 (1947); Lehrich
v. Sixth Ave. Bancorporation, 250 App. Div. 391, 296 N. Y. S. 358 (1937) ; Kelly
v. Internat'l. Clay Products Co., 239 Pa. 383, 140 Atl. 143 (1928); Riddell v.
Rochester German Ins. Co., 35 R. I. 45, 85 Atl. 273 (1912); STEvENs, CoaRoRA-
TiONS 851 (1936); BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS 731 (1946).
" Lyman v. Knickerbocker Theatre Co., 5 F. 2d 538 (D. C. Cir. 1925) ; For-
cite Powder Co. v. Herdien, 162 Ill. App. 425 (1911) ; New England Auto Inv.
Co. v. Andrews, 47 R. I. 108, 130 At. 863 (1925) ; Floerchinger v. Sioux Falls
Gas Co., 68 S. D. 543, 5 N. W. 2d 55 (1942) ; Miller Management Co. v. State,
140 Tex. 370, 167 S. W. 2d 728 (1943); Swing v. Parkersburg Veneer & Panel
Co., 45 W. Va. 288, 31 S. E. 926 (1898).
"Marian Phosphate Co. v. Perry, 74 Fed. 425 (5th Cir. 1$96); U. S. to
use of Colonial Brick Corp. v. Federal Surety Co., 72 F. 2d 961 (4th Cir. 1934),
cert. denied, 294 U. S. 741 (1934); Ex parte, Davis 240 Ala. 668, 162 So. 306(1935) ; Fitts v. Nat'l. L. Ass'n., 130 Ala. 413, 30 So. 374 (1901) ; Trust Co. v.
Mortgage-Bond Co., 203 Ga. 461, 46 S. E. 2d 883 (1949) (domestic statute not used
because the New York corporation had not done business in Georgia); United
States Truck Co. v. Pennsylvania Surety Co., 259 Mich. 422, 243 N. W. 311
(1932); Hirson v. United Stores Corp., 263 App. Div. 646, 34 N. Y. S. 2d 122
(1942); Note, 27 ILL L. REv. 310 (1932). Cases not mentioning any relief;
Ralfe v. Rundle, 103 U. S. 222 (1880) ; Gulledge Bros. Lumber Co. v. Wenatchee
Land Co., 115 Minn. 491, 132 N. W. 992 (1911); McDonald v. Pacific States Life
Ins. Co., 344 Mo. 1, 124 S. W. 2d 1157 (1939).
, Fidelity Metals Corp. v. Risley, 77 Cal. App. 2d 377, 175 P. 2d 592 (1946).
" United States Truck Co. v. Pennsylvania Surety Corp., 259 Mich. 422, 243
N. W. 311 (1932).
Clark v. Williard. 249 U. S. 211 (1935).
N. C. GEN. STAT. §55-132 (1943) "All corporations whose charters expire
by their own limitation or are annulled by forfeiture or otherwise, shall continue
to be bodies corporate for three years after the time when they would have been
dissolved, for purpose of prosecuting and defending actions ... to settle and close
their concerns ......
1949]
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whether it covers foreign corporations.3 8 One federal case from North
Carolina held the statute was not applicable to a dissolved New Jersey
corporation suing here, but that corporation was extended indefinitely
for winding up by the law that dissolved it and the result was to permit
the suit here six years after dissolution, whereas the North Carolina
statute would have barred the action if it had been held applicable .3
A federal court in New York disallowed North Carolina judgments
presented there as having no extraterritoriality because they were taken
against a dissolved foreign corporation, but presumably they would
have been good in North Carolina and perhaps in a third state against
assets of the corporation. 40  North Carolina refers to foreign corpora-
tions as being domesticated when they do business here and might use
that theory to apply our statute to foreign corporations. 41  Certain for-
eign corporations are required to deposit funds with the state before
being admitted, and these funds should be available to local creditors
even after the foreign dissolution of their depositor.42  North Carolina
freely allows statutory service of process against foreign corporations
which have withdrawn from the state, and might do the same when they
are dissolved on the theory that the agency for service, i.e., the Sec-
retary of State, is not revocable as to prior causes of action.48  Our
statutory service of process has been applied in the case of dissolved
8In Kruger v. Bank of Commerce, 123 N. C. 16, 31 S. E. 270 (1898), the
court held that a New York dissolution and appointment of receiver had no effect
on an attachment by local creditors of the corporation's property in North Car-
olina. Judge Clark concludes with this: "This sums up the doctrine as almost
universally recognized, and especially is this so in states like ours, in which by
statute the existance of corporations is continued for the benefit of creditors and
winding up affairs, for a prescribed time after the charter has expired or been
declared forfeited. Life Asso. v. Fossett, 102 Ill., 315." The case cited expressly
applies a domestic extension statute to a foreign corporation.
'
9Harris-Woodbury Lumber Co. v. Coffin, 179 Fed. 257 (C. C. W. D. N. C.
1910), aff'd, Coffin v. Harris-Woodbury Lumber Co., 187 Fed. 1005 (4th Cir.
1911).
40 Robinson v. Mutual Reserve Life Ins. Co., 182 Fed. 850 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
1910), aff'd, 189 Fed. 347 (1911); Van Schaick v. Parsons, 11 F. Supp. 654 (D.
Mont. 1935).
" John P. Nutt Corp. v. Southern Ry., 214 N. C. 19, 197 S. E. 534 (1938);
Smith-Douglass Co. v. Huneycutt, 204 N. C. 219, 167 S. E. 810 (1933); Troy &
N. C. Gold Mining Co. v. Snow Lumber Co., 173 N. C. 593, 92 S. E. 494 (1917).
In Debnam v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 126 N. C. 831, 36 S. E. 269 (1900), the
court said that our license statute in effect created a new domestic corporation,
so as to deny it removal to the federal court. This holding, was limited in South-
ern Ry. Co. v. Allison, 190 U. S. 326 (1903), but that opinion is carefully limited
in scope to the issue of denial of federal jurisdiction. Cf. Central Motor Lines,
Inc. v. Brooks Transp. Co., 225 N. C. 733, 36 S. E. 2d 271 (1945), where our
court speaks of the Debnam case as being over-ruled, in deciding that a New
Jersey corporation which had withdrawn from the state could not be served on a
cause of action that arose elsewhere.
'
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. §54-37 (1943) (bldg. & loan ass'n.); N. C. GEN. STAT.
§58-188.4 (1947 Cum. Supp.) (alien life insurance company).
" Harrison v. Corley, 226 N. C. 184, 37 S. E. 2d 489 (1946) ; State Highway
Comm. v. Diamond Steamship Transportation Corp., 225 N. C. 198, 34 S. E. 2d
78 (1945).
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domestic corporations, and since it expressly covers foreign corporations,
service would be no problem if the corporation was found to be ex-
tended, either by the North Carolina statute or the foreign law.44
The consideration of federal jurisdiction of these cases is important
because nearly all of them could go to the federal courts on diversity of
citizenship. If Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b) 45 is controlling,
the question presented here is foreclosed because the rule provides that
the capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be determined by the
law under which it was organized. The principal case refers to this as
being "merely expressive of the general law," pointedly refraining from
citing it as controlling. The difficulty arises from the dictum of Angel v.
Bullington46 that a Federal court in a diversity case is just another
state court and cannot entertain causes that the state court would not
entertain. 47 Similar reasoning would not allow removal on diversity of
citizenship to defeat a remedy which the plaintiff had in the state court. 48
If, under its conflict of laws rule, North Carolina regarded its local
statute as controlling the extension of the local existence of a dissolved
foreign corporation, then the Federal court in North Carolina would
be bound by the rule of the forum 49 and Rule 17(b) would again be of
doubtful value as a defense to the dissolved corporation. And though
constitutional questions of full faith and credit, equal protection of
laws, and impairment of contracts have been raised in these actions,
they would not be in the complaint against a foreign corporation in
the state court; therefore, the corporation could not get removal to the
Federal court on the grounds of a federal question at issue in order to
defeat the diversity difficulty50 There is the additional possibility that
removal on diversity grounds might also be lost if the suggestions
made in federal bankruptcy cases are followed to the effect that when a
corporation is dissolved it can be brought in as an unincorporated asso-
ciation,51 as every member might not have complete diversity. This
approach is exemplified by the treatment of a dissolved foreign cor-
poration as a domestic de facto corporation to allow suit.52
"' Sisk v. Old Hickory Motor Freight, 222 N. C. 631, 24 S. E. 2d 488 (1943).
N. C. GEN. STAT. §55-38 (1943) (if foreign corporation fails to appoint a process
agent, service may be had on the Secretary of State). N. C. GEN. STAT §58-50
(1943) (statutory process agent for a foreign insurance company is irrevocable).
"See 58 HtAv. L. REv. 675, 691 for criticism of the rule.
40330 U. S. 183 (1946).
"In United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 307 (1947), the court
carefully limits the scope of this rule.
" 3 MooRe's FEDERAL PRAcTICE 1397-98 (2d ed. 1948).
" Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Co., 313 U. S. 487 (1941).
o Tennessee v. Union and Planter's Bank, 152 U. S. 454 (1894).
"Peer Manor Bldg. Corp., 143 F. 2d 769 (7th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323
U. S. 757 (1944). Contra: Matter of Midwest Athletic Club, 161 F. 2d 1005(7th Cir. 1947). 6 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 4.05 [5] (14th ed. 1942).
"' Life Ass'n of America v. Fassett, 102 I1. 315 (1882); Rogers v. Adriatic
F. Ins. Co., 148 N. Y. 34, 42 N. E. 515 (1895).
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The free dissolution, both voluntary and involuntary, of modern cor-
porations should not defeat their suability in other sovereign states.5
3
The analogy of dissolution to natural death in its old aspect is fallacious,
in that it carries forward the common law conception of evaporation of
the corporation, whereas today there are shareholders, assets, and suc-
cessors to wind up its affairs and they should answer to suits brought
in the corporate name. The corporate entity does not extend beyond
the borders of its creating state until another state admits it, and when
so admitted, some new sort of entity is reincorporated which should not
be said to "die" when the other state dissolves that which it created. 4
The local forum can subscribe to pro rata distribution of assets and still
protect local creditors by giving them their share out of local assets,
and thus not force them to go to the creating jurisdiction with their
claim.55 Corporations should no longer be able to defeat civil and
criminal actions brought against them by working a dissolution in the
creating state, only to reappear the next day in identical form with a
new charter. 56 With the present ability of corporations to shop for the
most advantageous state corporation law, the only other real solution
would be the drastic legislation already introduced in Coilgress requiring
a federal charter for all corporations engaging in interstate commerce. 5T
EDWARD B. Hipp.
Corporations-Taxation-Status of Payments to Hybrid
Security Holders
It often becomes necessary for a court to determine whether certain
hybrid securities are in fact stocks or bonds.1 This determination is
frequently essential in order to ascertain whether periodic payments by
a corporation to the holders of its securities should be classified as
interest on indebtedness, which is deductable from gross income for
income tax purposes, 2 or as dividends to stockholders, which are not
"
3See note 3 supra.5 4 HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 278 and 313 (1923).
Notes, 35 CALIF. L. REv. 306 (1947), 13 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 283 (1936).
' See note 3 mspra.
" U. S. News & World Report, Oct. 14, 1949, p. 30. Cf. English Companies
Act (1929) §338(2) (providing that foreign corporations be wound up as un-
registered companies despite dissolution by the creating state).
1 The distinction between these securities must in many cases be ascertained
in order for the court to establish the priority between a certificate holder and
general unsecured or subsequent secured creditors of the corporation. Warren v.
King, 108 U. S. 389 (1883) (foreclosure proceeding) ; Mathews v. Bradford, 70
F. 2d 77 (6th Cir. 1934) (receivership proceeding); Spencer v. Smith, 201 Fed.
647 (8th Cir. 1912) (bankruptcy proceeding); Phoenix Hotel Co., 13 F. Supp.
229 (E. D. Ky. 1935) (reorganization proceeding).
2 INT. REv. CODE §23. "In computing net income there shall be allowed as
deductions: (b) Interest.-All interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on
indebtness, except on indebtness incurred or continued to purchase or carry obli-
[Vol. 28
